Files
agent/papers/items/2026-2607-05132-when-agents-lie-premeditation-persistence-and-exploitation-in-repeated-games.md
2026-07-08 12:25:30 +08:00

1.5 KiB

Paper: When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games


type: paper title: "When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games" authors: Jerick Shi, Terry Jingcheng Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin year: 2026 venue: arXiv url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.05132 code_url: source: arxiv collected_at: 2026-07-08 published_at: 2026-07-06 updated_at: 2026-07-07 status: queued relevance: high topics:

  • agent-evaluation
  • agent-safety
  • planning
  • tool-use methods:

benchmarks:

models:

datasets:

  • cs.CY
  • cs.CL related_concepts:

collection_score: 14 collection_queries: autonomous-agent-llm, llm-agent, planning-agent

One-line Takeaway

Auto-collected from arXiv because it matched the Agent collection queries. Needs human skim.

Why Collected

  • matched queries: autonomous-agent-llm, llm-agent, planning-agent
  • inferred topics: agent-evaluation, agent-safety, planning, tool-use
  • arXiv categories: cs.CY, cs.CL
  • collection score: 14

Review Checklist

  • Does this paper directly inform Agent architecture, evaluation, memory, tools, safety, coding agents, GUI/browser agents, or multi-agent workflows?
  • Does it include a benchmark, dataset, code, or reproducible experimental setup?
  • Should it be promoted from queued to skimmed or summarized?