1.5 KiB
1.5 KiB
Paper: When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games
type: paper title: "When Agents Lie: Premeditation, Persistence, and Exploitation in Repeated Games" authors: Jerick Shi, Terry Jingcheng Zhang, Bernhard Schölkopf, Vincent Conitzer, Zhijing Jin year: 2026 venue: arXiv url: https://arxiv.org/abs/2607.05132 code_url: source: arxiv collected_at: 2026-07-08 published_at: 2026-07-06 updated_at: 2026-07-07 status: queued relevance: high topics:
- agent-evaluation
- agent-safety
- planning
- tool-use methods:
benchmarks:
models:
datasets:
- cs.CY
- cs.CL related_concepts:
related_jobs:
related_experiments:
related_projects:
collection_score: 14 collection_queries: autonomous-agent-llm, llm-agent, planning-agent
One-line Takeaway
Auto-collected from arXiv because it matched the Agent collection queries. Needs human skim.
Why Collected
- matched queries: autonomous-agent-llm, llm-agent, planning-agent
- inferred topics: agent-evaluation, agent-safety, planning, tool-use
- arXiv categories: cs.CY, cs.CL
- collection score: 14
Review Checklist
- Does this paper directly inform Agent architecture, evaluation, memory, tools, safety, coding agents, GUI/browser agents, or multi-agent workflows?
- Does it include a benchmark, dataset, code, or reproducible experimental setup?
- Should it be promoted from
queuedtoskimmedorsummarized?